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I am delighted for the opportunity offered by HDSR to have a wide-ranging conversation over the role 
of data science in the COVID-19 pandemic, and I am grateful to all the discussants for their generous 
comments and insightful expansions on my original piece. In what follows, I identify and discuss four 
key topics that emerged from this conversation, with the aim to prompt further dialogue on the use of 
data science to tackle the pandemic as well as on the future of data science and its role in society 
beyond the current crisis.
From Clinical Spaces to Planetary Health
I will start from Ogburn’s excellent discussion of clinical decision-making as a 6th imaginary for data 
use: one which has received little attention and thus largely failed to inspire health-related data 
practices, at least so far. As Ogburn notes, this 6th imaginary needs to include concrete means to 
coordinate randomised clinical trials (RCTs)—and related standards, design and data infrastructures—
around the world. In the absence of such coordination, a large proportion of the trials set up to test 
possible COVID treatments produced ‘inactionable’ data; and drugs have been administered to COVID 
patients in the face of little or mixed evidence of their effectiveness. Ogburn provides important 
advice on how to avoid such dangerous failures, such as investing in international data infrastructures 
(a point I shall come back to throughout this text), applying stricter methods to decide which clinical 
trials should be going ahead, and rewarding researchers for contributing to large multi-sited trials 
over leading local trials of relatively little power and significance. At the same time, she evokes 
multiple audiences who should be consulted in the design and regulation of such a data sharing 
system. In her words: “we need data scientists to work with bioethicists, regulators, epistemologists, 
clinicians, and researchers to develop a framework for balancing, weighting, quantifying, and 
aggregating evidence across different domains such as animal models, biological and in vitro 
experiments, observational analyses, and exploratory RCTs.” While she does not mention this 
explicitly, I think this involves two important conceptual moves for the production and evaluation of 
medical evidence as a whole.
First is the need to expand existing understandings of clinically actionable evidence beyond RCTs. 
RCTs have long been marked as a ‘gold standard’ for medical evidence by the evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) movement, the pinnacle of the ‘evidence pyramid’ typically employed to depict the various 
forms of evidence available to (see Figure 1). The pandemic has given reason to re-iterate the 
importance of well-run RCTs, and yet also it raised an additional question: does the recognition that 
RCTs are effective in producing reliable evidence necessarily involve mistrust of other data sources? I 
would argue that this is not the case, especially in a pandemic situation where observational data 
coming from the medical frontline has provided information of great and immediate significance for 
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clinical decisions. Ogborn is of course right to note that much of such evidence is inconclusive and 
problematic when considered in and by itself, and RCTs retain a crucial role in verifying the 
effectiveness of proposed treatments. At the same time, observational data and experiences from 
medical staff play a key role in fostering the discovery of potential treatments. They are at the bottom 
of the evidence pyramid not because they are “bad evidence”, but because they are foundational to all 
other forms of data collection. In this sense, biomedical researchers confronted with an evolving 
emergency would benefit enormously from an effective system to collect and compare a broader range 
of data sources collected on the medical frontline as well as the lab. Publishing such data in medical 
journals is a relatively slow and ineffective way to facilitate evidence integration, and precludes 
making datasets searchable and interoperable. Hence the need to develop and implement a 
comprehensive strategy to identify, share and analyse data of potential relevance to public health. This 
should constitute the top priority for funders and policy- makers looking at strengthening 
preparedness for future disasters (see also the ongoing work and recommendations of the Research 
Data Alliance COVID-19 Working Group: https://www.rd-alliance.org/groups/rda-covid19 ).
The second conceptual move is the relation between the technical discussion around which data should 
inform clinical decision-making and how, and broader questions around what is taken to constitute the 
‘clinical space’ and why. Ongoing efforts to tackle the pandemic are contributing to the recognition that 
the clinic is not a self-contained space for administering treatment to patients. Clinics are 
Figure 1. The pyramid structure of sources of evidence according to evidence-
based medicine, where the pinnacle of the pyramid comprises the most reliable 
source. Whether or not one agrees with this ranking, the question to ask is whether and 
how different levels of evidence depend on each other (from 
https://sites.google.com/site/evidencebasedd/types- of-pyramid, CC-BY).
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interconnected with the rest of society in myriad ways which are extremely difficult to contain and 
control. Countless forms of data are produced and haphazardly disseminated. Opinions are formed 
and circulated among staff and patients alike, sometimes making their way into social media and news 
outlets. Various forms of waste—including infected or radioactive materials—circulate in and out of 
hospitals. Human traffic is also considerable. People enter the clinic for widely different reasons, 
ranging from in-patient visits to regular health checks; and clinical workers (including cleaners, 
technicians, nursing staff, doctors, and administrators) have regular contact with their own social 
networks. As famously argued by Michel Foucault (1963), among others, attempts to curb and control 
these flows of materials, knowledge and agency have shaped the clinical space since its 18th century 
emergence.
In the case of COVID-19, the clinic’s unavoidable interrelation with the world has been curbed through 
efforts to minimize exposure to the clinical space, as exemplified by full-body PPE and extreme social 
distancing. This has proved extremely demanding on all the humans involved. Stories of doctors living 
apart from their children and patients being forcibly separated from loved ones (including those 
receiving care for non-COVID diseases or for conditions that have nothing to do with illness, such as 
pregnancy) have highlighted the sense of alienation underpinning the social distancing enforced by the 
pandemic upon large sections of human society, as well as the crucial role of the clinic as a crucible of 
social experiences. Images of clinicians holding up a phone for critically ill patients to speak to parents, 
children or spouses, so frequently seen on the news, have now entered the lived experience of many of 
us as cases multiply particularly in Europe and North America. Data scientists working on pandemic 
responses need to acknowledge and investigate the sociality of the clinical space and what this means 
for the selection and analysis of health data. Like other spaces of social containment, such as prisons 
and immigration camps, clinics exemplify the difficulties of isolating the sick and the devastating 
emotional, physical and social effects of COVID-19. Perhaps more overtly than other spaces of social 
containment, clinics also offer hope through treatment, thus producing countless opportunities for 
data scientists to constructively engage with the vast information being produced in order to improve 
the effectiveness as well as the humanity of clinical care.
Public health in this broad sense affects all forms of sociality and related spaces. Reflection on the 
porous boundaries of the clinical space, and the roles that data science could play within and beyond 
them, is therefore compatible with recognizing the role that data science could play in other settings, 
ranging from prisons to schools and workplaces. Hence, I fully agree with Kolaczyk et al. that “while 
the contributions of data science can certainly be scoped around the healthcare and public health 
needs, it should not be limited to them.”
This point beautifully complements the analysis of the clinical actionability provided by Ogburn, and I 
certainly never intended to imply otherwise: my proposed imaginaries 4 and 5 (using data to address 
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logistical and social need) involve data-intensive research spanning virtually all social domains and 
contexts, from travel to urban design, employment rights to racial inequity.
Kolaczyk et al. rightly emphasize that the insistence on a holistic, transdisciplinary, and socially-
engaged approach to disasters, including pandemic, is not new. There is a long history of researchers, 
activists, and international organizations repeatedly asking for substantive and wide-ranging 
investment in preparedness over the last century. What is perhaps more novel, at least in terms of 
public perception of risk, is the increasingly strong overlap between health concerns around the 
pandemic and environmental concerns around humans mistreating the planet and its non-human 
inhabitants. As the clinical space expands into society at large, the pandemic has made ever more 
apparent how public health depends on the wide variety of creatures that populate our shared 
habitats. Truly, the idea of planetary health is taking hold: we are all in this together, not just as human 
race, but as living organisms co-existing in a complex ecosystem whose resilience is being tested to its 
limits. Maintaining this awareness while working towards improved data infrastructures and 
evidential strategies for clinical decision-making is a crucial requirement for 21st-century data science.
From Imagination to Socially-Robust Action
Louissaint’s piece is a call to act now since, as she puts it, “the middle of a pandemic response is not the 
time for future gazing.” Her powerful contribution identifies several critical concerns that data science 
can immediately help to address and mitigate, including the spread of misinformation, housing and 
economic insecurity, and the unequitable impact of COVID-19 on minorities and vulnerable parts of the 
population among many others—thus stressing the importance of addressing social needs, which I had 
identified as the fifth imaginary for data use. I certainly agree with her that time is of the essence in 
grappling with issues that are causing untold amounts of suffering every day that goes by. As I write, 
COVID-19 infections—including those caused by newly evolved variants—are inflicting record-
breaking death tolls and long-term disability levels across the American continents, Africa, and 
Europe. When calling for data scientists to consider the imaginaries underpinning their work, I am 
therefore not asking researchers to waste precious time, but rather to secure means to assess and 
question the social robustness of the solutions that they develop.
Time and time again in the history of science and technology, tools developed with the best intentions 
and under enormous pressure to address urgent social challenges have turned out to have 
questionable long-term effects (think only of nuclear power, genetic engineering and facial recognition 
systems as glaring examples). This cannot be avoided: nobody can control precisely how a given 
application or technique will be used once it starts travelling across contexts, and it remains hard to 
determine when the risks of a given technology may outweigh its advantages. However, the rush to 
offer solutions cannot be used as an excuse to avoid any consideration of the social embedding of those 
solutions. In other words, the scientific imagination needs to include the social, and to do that beyond 
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mere wishful thinking about ‘best scenarios’ in highly idealised settings. Many researchers are 
committed to devoting their efforts to the public good; fewer researchers attempt to explicitly 
articulate and question their own assumptions about what the public good involves, for whom, and 
under which conditions. It is this latter effort which, I argued in my paper, requires conversations 
beyond one’s own discipline and habitual peers. Just like the scientific imagination is grounded on 
empirical insights about the way the world is, so is the social imagination for how scientific outputs 
may affect the world. For any given context, there will be a cluster of experts (which may include 
social scientists as well as humanists, community representatives, professional figures and civil 
servants, among others) who possess an evidence-based understanding of that specific context. This 
knowledge can and should be mined when assessing how a given technical solution may or may not 
work within a given socio-cultural setting. Furthermore, history demonstrates how creative uses of 
data can be spurred at least as much by confronting the concrete characteristics of real-world 
situations as they are by pursuing highly idealized visions of the future of humanity. Consider the 
frequency with which revolutionary discoveries have emerged from highly applied data analysis, 
ranging from the rise of computing from WWII cryptography to the birth of epidemiology from the 
mapping of cholera transmission on the street maps of 19th century London.
The attention paid to tracing apps in the first few months of the pandemic is a case in point. This was a 
situation where the opportunity to combine smartphone use and data science to track the spread of 
contagion—and alert individuals who may be at risk—was widely perceived as key to pandemic 
containment. And indeed, this solution seems to have yielded public health benefits when it was 
integrated from the get-go with other public health measures, including traditional contact tracing via 
local health authorities and individualized medical support (as was arguably the case in Ireland and 
Germany; see Jee, 2020). In other words, this solution proved useful when it was immediately and 
sustainably complemented by meaningful, well-informed action on the ground. In many cases, 
however, this did not happen. Technology was presented as working in and of itself, and little effort 
was devoted to aligning it with social and medical services, and/or to consult on its broader impact on 
different social sectors and communities. Governments—including the UK, US, and Italy—invited 
their citizen to download tracing apps without securing support from local health authorities and 
consulting potential users, and, indeed, without integrating those tools into a broader public health 
plan of assistance and support for individuals at risk of contagion. The main ethical concern raised 
around the effectiveness of contact tracing apps was privacy, with Apple and Google coming to the 
rescue by proposing an additional technical fix—an anonymous, Bluetooth-based alert system geared 
to make it impossible to use such apps as surveillance tools. Yet, again, this way of solving the privacy 
issue was not scrutinized for its broader consequences: the app had to be launched as quickly as 
possible to ensure effective tracking and tracing of the disease, and an empirically-informed 
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evaluation of its social implementation was seen as wasted time in the midst of an unfolding 
emergency.
As it turned out, the rollout of the tracing system proposed by Apple and Google actually made it 
harder for health authorities to intervene effectively. Its privacy-preserving features got in the way of 
efforts to verify who had been alerted by the app and provide adequate support to those individuals, 
their families, and employers; helping individuals to distinguish false alarms from genuine risk; and 
using such information to strengthen understanding of contagion locally and nationally, thus informing 
further interventions. This in turn generated a widespread loss of trust with the app among the 
citizens who were supposed to rely on it. Hence not only have many tracing apps—and related 
investments—not lived up to their hype as key tools for the pandemic response in Europe and North 
America, but their problematic implementation has fostered disillusionment with governmental 
interventions and scientific advice, at a moment where misinformation and mistrust of authorities 
were already having crippling effects on efforts to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Public health 
experts, social scientists, and various citizen groups had warned against this outcome, and indeed, 
initiatives such as StopCovid in France attempted to avoid it by setting up a home-grown system 
intended to safeguard citizen rights while also enabling support by local health authorities (Krige and 
Leonelli, 2021). It is early to evaluate the overall effectiveness of these initiatives, and whether and 
how contact tracing through smartphones actually contributed to the pandemic response, but the rush 
to implement such systems as immediate technical fixes regardless of the social context does not seem 
to have paid off.
The scientific imagination around tracing infections failed to adequately consider the social, and, in 
doing so, damaged public trust in both government and science. This is the kind of rush that we want 
to avoid, in my view.
From Politics of Data Science to Politics in Data Science
This brings me to the role of politics in data science, and the thorny issue of whether and how to split 
accountability for the success and failures of proposed solutions between, on the one hand, the 
scientists who decide whether and how to develop them and, on the other hand, the policy-makers 
who decide whether and how to implement those solutions. El-Sayed and Prainsack eloquently 
illustrate the extent to which scientists bear responsibility for their interventions and proposals, for 
instance when determining what data should be collected in the first place – and thus which aspects of 
human experience are worth considering for further analysis. As demonstrated by my own work on 
data use, I agree with their arguments and did not mean to belittle the political role and 
responsibilities of data scientists (and other experts) in the context of the pandemic and beyond. 
Rather, I meant to stress the substantive responsibilities borne by policy-makers, which range from 
their role in shaping the conditions for scientific work, including setting goals and allocating financial 
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resources, to their translation of scientific findings into social interventions, which requires 
interpreting those findings in light of specific socioeconomic priorities. Hence my argument that policy-
makers should not defer responsibility for their actions to the scientists—a strategy that has proved 
disturbingly popular among political leaders confronted with the stark consequences of social 
distancing measures, with many claiming to be “led by science” when asked to justify their decisions 
(Dupré, 2020).
How to make sense of the complex relation between scientific and political responsibilities and 
interventions in the context of a major emergency such as the pandemic? I am convinced that political 
commitments and related accountabilities are present in both research and policy-making, but that 
they take different forms within these two realms.
While data scientists need to recognize and explicitly address the role played by politics within their 
research, they have limited control on the material and financial conditions under which their work is 
supported and on how their work may be used as evidence for policy measures. What scientists do 
have, particularly those in established positions, is the opportunity to consider how political 
circumstances and commitments may impact the direction, methods, and outcomes of their research; 
and to challenge political decisions, especially when they perceive some political readings of their 
work as clashing with their findings.
This is not quite the same as ‘speaking truth to power.’ For a start, science does not produce absolute, 
unassailable truths. Rather, science produces evidence and arguments for why certain claims are 
highly plausible, in the hope to foster an ongoing dialogue over the significance of those claims, 
including the ways in which they could be challenged. In this sense, the prediction that a given vaccine, 
when administered in specific doses, is effective in over 90% of cases is not a statement of truth. 
Rather, it is an assertion grounded in robust evidence and reasoning, and which therefore is more 
reliable than assertions that have no such grounding. The opportunity to explain and reproduce 
scientific reasoning and methods, the lack of dogmatism and the openness to critical scrutiny are key 
ingredients for the success of science as a system to produce reliable knowledge—arguably the best 
ever devised in order to understand the world. This system also includes mechanisms to identify the 
value-judgements made by researchers in their work, and make them as explicit as possible so that 
they can be evaluated as part of the scientific output. This is what many students of science—and 
some political figures, as demonstrated by Lord Clements-Jones in his comments—mean when 
pointing out that science is value-laden through and through (e.g. Douglas, 2009). Most of the 
researchers working on COVID-19 vaccines are motivated by a strong desire to curb transmission: this 
is an ethical and political commitment that is openly acknowledged and accepted as an incentive rather 
than an obstacle to the production of reliable knowledge.
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There are, of course, values and commitments that do stand in the way of good science. Recognizing 
science as value-laden is not a license for scientists to cherry-pick results and ignore ‘inconvenient’ 
findings on the basis of one’s beliefs and interests. Quite the contrary: it is a recognition that such 
practices exist, whether by accident or by design, and that the research community as a whole is 
committed to identifying practices that may be problematic or misleading in the context at hand, and 
rooting them out. In his discussion piece, Leslie has beautifully reviewed the development of such 
awareness throughout the 20th century, and highlighted the importance for scientists to commit to 
“carrying out the endeavours of science in the public interest” with an eye to social inclusion and 
planetary health. These views mirror Lord Clements-Jones’ invitation for governments to “lead the way 
in actively explaining how data is being used”—which as, he rightly points out, is critical to retaining 
public trust—and for scientists to pay attention to the values instantiated by their work.
What does this mean for data scientists in concrete terms? I will here briefly mention three crucial 
junctures where data scientists could benefit from an explicit reflection on the values underpinning 
their technical decisions. A first juncture happens when evaluating whether to participate in a given 
project or call for funding. It should be clear to scientists that agreement to contribute to a particular 
research program does imply some degree of acceptance of the overall goals and methods set by the 
project or funding call in question, including the all-importance choice of admissible data types 
emphasised by El-Sayed and Prainsack. In turn, the choice of whether or not to contribute to a 
particular research agenda involves some degree of responsibility over prioritizing that agenda over 
and above other possible topics. A second juncture happens when designing the research plans and 
choosing methods and relevant stakeholders. It is often at this stage that decisions are made around 
which sources and experiences to engage, and whether and how to identify social impact and relevant 
communities. Ideally, as I argued in my article, these decisions should be made with support from 
social scientists and representatives of communities with a stake in the potential application of 
results. With finite resources and timelines, however, hard choices typically need to be made about 
which interlocutors are best placed to support the project and which sources need to be excluded. 
These choices are strongly constrained by logistical and institutional conditions, including whether or 
not certain types of expertise are accessible (e.g., whether representatives of a given patient group are 
available for consultation) and whether there is scope to engage in such dialogue given the timeframe 
and resources of the project. Yet the ethos and preferences of investigators also play an important role 
in decisions around how much and how long to invest in identifying and pursuing such engagements, 
and how central a role they play in a project. A third juncture happens when researchers consider how 
to interpret and communicate project results. Like decisions around research design, such 
assessments can benefit from reflection over responsible and socially sensitive ways to frame and 
release outputs.
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The importance of recognizing the political and value-laden aspects of research, and the ingenious 
ways in which scientific methods and debates can help to articulate and evaluate them, cannot be 
underestimated. This is particularly the case since scientific decisions are made in a politically-charged 
space, where—as so evident in the case of the pandemic—policy-makers have already defined funding 
priorities and the areas where they wish to see swift progress, often on the basis of predetermined 
expectations around how research findings may be used to inform social interventions. As Porter 
forcefully argues in his comments, political action is itself shaped by “an engrained economy of 
politics,” within which market forces and complex bureaucracies govern the political space to the point 
of determining the direction and outcomes of much political action. This is also a landscape where, 
democratic structures notwithstanding, power tends to remain concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small elite—an elite that sometimes includes scientists themselves, which is another reason 
to move away from the rhetoric of science “speaking truth to power.” This enduring reality makes well-
intended proposals for the future of technology, such as the “Great Reset” of digital activities proposed 
by the World Economic Forum to address digital inequity and discrimination (WEF, 2020), sound 
hollow and unrealistic. Rather than providing an inspiration, such utopic visions of the power of 
science and technology risk being perceived as a distraction from increasing evidence that the 
pandemic crisis has augmented digital and social divides all around the globe, with many policies 
failing to address the multiple forms of “public benefit” required to support widely diverse sections of 
human society.
In such a context, an assessment of political accountabilities—particularly vis-à-vis scientific findings
—remains an indispensable component of any attempt to react to the pandemic without accelerating 
the self-destructive path of our planet. In the face of self-interested, nationalistic policies sprouting in 
most parts of the world, it is not trivial to assert that the responsibility for setting out priorities and 
expectations falls on politicians, whose job involves evaluating the implications of a given intervention 
for the complex socio-economic landscape at hand—an assessment explicitly informed, within 
democratic systems, by the core values of their party and the promises made to their electorate. At the 
same time, scientists can and should challenge policy-makers on the priorities that they set out, 
particularly in cases where scientific evidence can be interpreted as clashing with policy directions. 
Anthony Fauci’s staunch resistance to the campaign of misinformation and disruption waged by 
President Trump, which arguably resulted in hundreds of thousands of American deaths, provided a 
prominent example of such a challenge. It could of course be argued that Fauci’s role as the director of 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and a leading member of the White House 
Coronavirus Task Force placed him in a uniquely influential and socially-accountable position, making 
this example an exception rather than the rule for scientific engagement with policy. Yet such 
engagement can also happen through more informal channels, as in the case of the Independent SAGE 
advisory committee in the UK. This group comprises prominent public health researchers who felt 
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dissatisfied with the existing scientific advisory group to the government (known as the SAGE group), 
chiefly due to the somewhat secretive nature of SAGE deliberations and to suspicions of political 
interference with SAGE by government representatives. Members of the committee volunteered their 
expertise towards providing their own assessment of emerging scientific evidence on the pandemic 
and what kinds of social interventions this assessment may warrant.
The case of Independent SAGE usefully exemplifies the tensions and problems raised by political 
action undertaken by researchers. On the one hand, this is a clear case of researchers making their 
values and political stance explicit, by questioning government policies and putting forward concrete 
alternative proposals (such as closing down schools and extending lockdown measures in the fall of 
2020). On the other hand, these researchers have not explicitly acknowledged the political nature of 
their intervention, preferring instead to highlight the extent to which their pronouncements are 
grounded on a rigorous and transparent interpretation of comprehensive scientific evidence. Their 
chosen motto is, accordingly, ‘following the science.’ Given the prominence of a public discourse that 
confers authority to science on the basis of its putative objectivity rather than its relentless ability to 
challenge dogmatism with evidence, it is not surprising that such prominent researchers feel that 
acknowledging their political judgements would undermine the authority and reliability of their 
scientific work. In my view, this is a symptom of a societal and cultural failure to adequately engage 
with scientific research and its outputs. As Leslie also highlighted, the tension between scientific 
objectivity and political advocacy only arises when denying that scientific work emerges from a 
political context and its interpretation is, accordingly, value-laden. Independent SAGE has stressed 
that the reliability of its advice can be assessed through its efforts to lay out the underpinning 
reasoning for external scrutiny. The insistence thus placed on open debate and critical scrutiny reflects 
an understanding of the scientific endeavour as anti-dogmatic, thus following in steps of prominent 
20th century thinkers such as Robert K Merton and Karl Popper. This needs to be complemented by a 
21st century sensibility to recognising and acknowledging the political commitments and value 
judgements unavoidably involved in reasoning from evidence (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Leonelli, 
2018). Whenever scientists engage in a dialogue with policy-makers, they are explicitly considering 
some of the social, political and economic implications of their findings, and taking a position on 
whether such implications are desirable, and why. They are indeed including an imagination of the 
social into their science: something which is itself, as I argued above, subject to empirical scrutiny.
Looking for Hope: The Crucial Role of Transnational and 
Transdisciplinary Research Institutions
Can data science offer anything at all to the pandemic response, given the enormous (and enormously 
underestimated) limits of available data sources and modelling tools, the expanding digital divides 
that prevent engagement with most human experiences around the world, the entrenched market 
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logics and auditing systems used to administer essential resources from vaccines to food, and the 
extensive social barriers separating vulnerable populations from the political, financial and 
technocratic elite? It may be tempting at such a bleak time to say that the battle is lost, and all data 
scientists can do is act on the pretense of offering meaningful societal contributions. And yet, as the 
HDSR special issue on COVID-19 reminds us, data work continues to play a key role in the pandemic 
response. Effective data sharing and swift collaboration across genomic labs and clinical trials have 
yielded not just one, but multiple vaccines. Data science underpins key decisions on how to handle the 
outbreak, providing means to analyze evidence and compare scenarios in situations of real uncertainty 
where several outcomes are equally possible. Such expertise can serve even the most chaotic political 
scenarios. Consider again, for instance, the multiple U-turns of the Johnson government in the UK, 
which has radically changed its own policies on social distancing multiple times (and often from one 
day to the next) over the last few months.
Such U-turns may well be a signal of political incompetence, but they also exemplify the width of the 
political space within which data scientists move—including the diverse ways in how data are 
collected, analyzed and visualized can points to specific measures, and the social dialogue required to 
assess the broader implications of research results. There is hope in such drama, as well as an 
imperative for researchers to do all they can to promote socially robust research geared towards 
planetary health, and to call policy-makers to account when such commitment is betrayed in the name 
of other agendas.
To help data scientists build on such hope, it is indispensable for governments and industry to 
investment in institutions, venues and infrastructures that support transdisciplinary research at both 
the national and transnational levels. This is one aspect on which all participants in this HDSR 
conversation agree. The rapidity and robustness of data science insights depends on effective 
collaborations among several stakeholders. This in turn depends on the existence of shared platforms 
and effective communication networks that are built on the awareness of the social embedding of data 
science work. As Kolaczyk et al. highlighted, “we require more from data science than relatively 
isolated contributions and impromptu consortia,” and this means investment in dedicated human 
resources, long-term institutional agreement and commensurate financial arrangements.
Training for data scientists and their collaborators is a key component of this ambitious project. The 
various data science training program that have sprouted in institutions around the globe offer further 
hope in this respect, especially since many of them—including the data science program at my own 
University of Exeter—include training in data ethics and governance. What is particularly encouraging 
is seeing capacity for such training increase well beyond the Global North. An example of effective 
capacity building are the CODATA-RDA schools of research data science, which take place at regular 
intervals in different locations around the world, and are especially geared to welcoming students 
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from low-income countries who are interested in deepening their data science skills. I was temporarily 
involved in this program in 2015- 2016, when CODATA invited me to one of the early schools (taking 
place at the Indian Statistical Institute in Bangalore) with the aim to expose data science students to 
critical data studies and data ethics. Thanks to the many people involved since, including my colleague 
Louise Bezuidenhout who stewarded teaching on social aspects of data work, this program has 
blossomed into a well-attended and highly regarded event. Technical and social components of data 
science are taught together, with serious attention paid to the values and virtues required by different 
types of data work and the social imaginary that accompanies scientific visions of could and should be 
achieved (Bezuidenhout & Ratti, 2020).
Another key component of this transdisciplinary approach to data science infrastructures is the 
development of resources at both the national and the international levels. Kolaczyk et al. 
demonstrate what this may involve for the United States, where indeed there are resources that can 
be immediately placed at the service of a strengthened and more socially robust national response. 
Whether or not this is the case in any one country, it is imperative for every government and national 
agency to carefully consider how local services may intersect with those set up by other countries, and 
how data interoperability may be enhanced in ways that are responsible and safe for individuals. 
Transnational collaboration is fundamental to national goals for several reasons (see also Krige & 
Leonelli, 2021). It can help to ensure regular exchange of insights and solutions, and thus avoiding an 
inward- looking, isolationist system that struggles to incorporate and exploit technical developments 
developed elsewhere. It can foster coordination that maximizes each countries’ strengths and helps to 
counter-balance its weaknesses. And it can help to monitor whether and how data infrastructures are 
used as means of surveillance, particularly where such use may result in the infringement of human 
rights. The recently released Digital Services Act (European Commission, 2020), for instance, 
exemplifies a regulatory mechanism geared to the transnational monitoring of data services and 
infrastructures. This needs to be complemented by infrastructures and venues that make it possible 
for such transnational regulation to be implemented.
The road towards data science finding its rightful place alongside other research domains remains 
long, and it is made ever more arduous by the misleading hype surrounding its capacity to single-
handedly boost economies and address global challenges. However, there is perhaps a sense in which 
data science should be regarded as a ‘service domain’ after all: not in the sense of mindlessly serving 
any master or purpose, but rather by exemplifying the interdependence of the research enterprise 
with all other aspects of the social world. Good data science requires access to both data and relevant 
metadata, which in turn requires extensive engagement with human experience well beyond 
academia. Good data science demands venues and infrastructures to care for data, which in turn call 
for transnational dialogue and support by public and private institutions alike. Good data science 
involves relentlessly probing the limits and scope of models and algorithms, which in turn demands 
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exposure to - and critical questioning from - the broadest and most diverse audiences. Last but not 
least, good data science involves a long-term quest to better understand one’s social, political and 
economic context and impact, and to use that awareness to devise and implement an imaginary of data 
use.
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